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Title:       Phenomenological Method
Date:        2022-10-08
Tags:        box3, philosophy
Link:        https://spool-five.com/box3/20221008t000000--phenomenological-method__box3_philosophy/
Word Count:  658
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#philosophy[1]
=>[1] https://spool-five.com/box3/20220602t000000--philosophy__box3/

A difficult term to explain in a brief note, but I'll try anyway.

Phenomenology is a philosophical approach that aims to move away from
the subject-object division that pervaded modern philosophy and science
prior to the 20th century.

That trend tended to be concerned with 'objective' knowledge - knowledge
of the object apart from the subject. For example, think about water.
If we want to gain an 'objective' understanding of water, we might start
by describing its molecular make up (H2O), or its viscosity and
mechanics.

What about the 'wetness' of water? 'Wetness' only appears as a property
of water in relation to some kind of being (e.g., a human) who has the
capacity to sense this wetness. Even though we can't really say that
the 'wetness' fully comes from the experiencing subject (the human), we
also can't really say that it is a fundamental property of water. It we
really want to understand water in its most _objective_ sense, we need
to strip away these secondary properties (wetness), i.e., consider water
apart from its relationship to a _world_.

A _world_ can be understood as a living, evolving set of relations.
Phenomenology starts by returning to the _things themselves_ (as opposed
to the _things-in-themselves_). Things as pieces and actors within a
world, as opposed to _objects_ in a vacuum. There are no _subjects_ and
_objects_ 'in' a world; subjects and objects are constructs we have
developed to help us carve up the world into digestible pieces. But,
there is another way we could have done this, _another kind of
method_.

The phenomenological method consists in 'bracketing' the sorts of
conceptual concerns that shape our understanding of the world in terms
of subjects and objects. I am not 'Mark' (subject) walking on 'grass'
(object) in my bare feet, instead, we could simply say an experience of
softness/roughness/coldness is occurring. It happens to be occurring at
an infinitesimal series of points between different 'things' in the
world (blades of grass, soles of feet). Perhaps the experience is
pleasurable, perhaps it is irritating. This isn't the best example, but
the point is that phenomenology _starts with descriptions of experience_
and builds conclusions out from that. If you think about it, this is a
very different approach that beginning with some kind of theory or
concept of how things _should_ work, and then trying to apply it.

Whereas objectifying accounts of the world want to say that logic, forms,
etc. are the primary building blocks of reality - and therefore that
particular manifestations of these forms aren't as integral to the
meaning of something - phenomenology begins from the other direction;
particularities, experience - all the 'messiness' of the actual world
- are the _foundation_ of knowledge, and everything else has to begin
there.

Now, that is not to say that the 'mind' or formal questions play no
role. In fact, there is a formal schema that replaces the subject-object
division: noesis-noema. After all, the world is not simply a collection
of 'experiences', there are also '_experiencers_' - agents who interact
with the world. And there is a constant kind of relation between
experiencers and things - _intentionality_. Intentionality is the
'directedness' of an actor. For example, when I look at that building,
there is an intentional relation between me and the building. This
intentional relation is _noesis_. However, when I view the building,
from my particular vantage point, I never perceive the _entirety_ of
the thing. The _part_ or section of the thing that appears to me (is
'constituted') is the _noema_.

When we think about the world in terms of intentional relations between
'things', where only one part of the thing is being experienced at any
given moment, then we see how the world is an ever-shifting kaleidescope
of perception. It makes building a comprehensive 'theory of everything'
pretty difficult...but isn't that the point?